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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the existence of financial contagion in the European Union during 
the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(ESDC) that started in 2009. Our sample includes sectorial equity indices for 15 countries from 
2004 to 2014. We adopt an ADCC-GJR-GARCH model for the time-varying correlations and 
a Markov-Switching model to identify the lead/lag relationship in crisis transition dates across 
the countries and the sectors. We assess the patterns of financial contagion by sector and by 
country. Our results support the existence of financial contagion in all business sectors under 
the GFC and the ESDC. Financials and Telecommunications are the most affected, while the 
Industrials and the Consumer Goods the least in each crisis respectively. Stock markets in the 
Core EU are the most affected in both crises. We find evidence of a non-synchronised transition 
of all countries to the crisis regime, in both crises. We believe that our results may provide 
useful insights for investors and policy makers. 
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The increasing globalization and integration of financial markets IDFLOLWDWHVWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRID³6LQJOH
0DUNHW´DQGKDVWKHUHIRUHEHHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKSURVSHULW\DQGHFRQRPLFZHOOEHLQJNevertheless, at 
the same time financial integration may facilitate the spread of financial instability across countries and 
markets, as has been the case during both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC), with adverse impact on the relations amongst the member 
countries of the European Union (EU).  
 
Financial contagion, the phenomenon in which a financial crisis spreads across countries, has received 
a certain focus over the past two decades. Although no uniformly accepted definition exists for financial 
contagion, most of the empirical work typically follows the Forbes & Rigobon, (2002) and/or the 
Bekaert, Harvey, & Ng, (2005) seminal papers. One of the key distinctions in these two approaches is 
that the former, also dubbed as ³shift-contagion´, examines for a significant increase in the cross-market 
correlation following a crisis event, where the latter emphasizes the role of (economic) fundamentals 
by attributing the characterisation of contagion only when correlations significantly increase over and 
above what fundamentals can explain. 
 
In the field of empirical analysis, King & Wadhwani (1990) and Lee & Kim (1993) comprise some of 
the early work on the issue of financial contagion following the US stock market crash of October 1987. 
The East Asian crisis of 1997, the ³dot.com´ bubble of the early 2000s, the GFC of 2007 and the ESDC 
of 2009 have been used as a reference point to investigate contagion across a variety of countries (Cho 
and Parhizgari, 2008; Kenourgios, 2014; Naoui et al., 2010; Pappas et al., 2016; Yiu et al., 2010). Most 
of this research is focused on stock market indices (Chiang et al., 2007), however there are instances 
where exchange rates (Khalid and Rajaguru, 2007) or bond market data have been used (Coudert and 
Gex, 2010). Even rarer however are applications pertaining to sectorial equity data, with notable 
exceptions the studies of Baur (2012), Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) and Phylaktis & Xia (2009). All 
of these studies have some global focus as far as sectorial indices are concerned. For example, 
Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) use sectorial equity indices for six geographical regions (e.g., 
Developed Pacific, Emerging Asia). In terms of crisis focus, in the Phylaktis & Xia (2009) the data span 
covers most of the 1990s and early 2000s crises, from the 1992 ERM attacks up to the dot.com bubble. 
By contrast, Baur (2012) and Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) focus on the GFC and/or the ESDC crises. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess financial contagion across equity markets and business sectors in the 
EU following the GFC and the ESDC. For this purpose, we adopt a multivariate dynamic conditional 
correlation model. To identify lead/lag relationships in the crisis transition dates of the featured 
countries and business sectors we compare the estimated crisis transition dates from a Markov-
Switching model to the official timeliness of the GFC and the ESDC.1 To gauge the magnitude of 
financial contagion, we regress the conditional correlation estimates on a set of binary variables that 
identify different periods of the crisis in line with Kenourgios (2014) among others.   
 
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we conduct a geographically focused analysis within 
the EU-15. Previous studies have often included a subset of EU countries and/or had a global focus. 
This may have been desirable for certain crises (e.g., the GFC) but the ESDC is largely Europe-specific. 
Furthermore, the ties between EU (and moreover Eurozone) members are much stronger than any non-
                                                 
1
 Official timeliness of the crises are obtained from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2009) and the Federal 
Reserve Board (Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis (2009). 
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EU sample of countries. In this respect, we expect that our statistical results will reveal more clearly the 
dynamics of a financial crisis. These results, may prove useful to the EU policy makers in terms of 
policies designed for future events and to investors wishing to ensure proper country and/or sectorial 
diversification for their portfolios. 
 
Secondly, although other researchers have used sectorial equity indices, we are the first to the best of 
our knowledge to examine financial contagion in such a comprehensive manner. Specifically, we test 
for three distinct variants of financial contagion. Namely, within sector (across countries), within 
country (across sectors) and across country and sectors. The first allows us to examine if the existence, 
timing and magnitude of contagion differ by business sector. This variant assumes that the transmitter 
and the receiver of contagion is the same business sector and can classify them according to the 
resilience they offer to contagion transmission. The second examines how contagion spreads across the 
different business sectors within a country. Thus, it reveals similarities and differences in the resilience 
of each sector in each country. The third generalises even further by examining the magnitude of 
contagion where the transmitter and receiver may both be different countries and business sectors. 
Following the above analysis, we can derive valuable information for policy makers and investors since 
we can obtain very detailed dynamics dealing with the economic sectors and countries under 
investigation. 
 
A preview of our results follows. We verify the existence of financial contagion for all business sectors 
under the GFC and the ESDC. Financials and Telecommunications sectors are the most affected, while 
the Industrials and Consumer Goods sectors are the least from the GFC and the ESDC respectively. In 
addition, all countries experienced financial contagion at varying magnitudes, with those in the Core 
EU being the most affected in both crises. The timing of the financial contagion differs between the two 
crises with the Core EU countries being affected first in the GFC crisis, but those of the PIIGS group 
being first in the ESDC. In both cases, we find evidence of a non-synchronised transition of all countries 
to the crisis regime. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the data while Section 4 presents the methodology we utilise. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the results analysis. A final section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Financial contagion may be perceived as the dark side of financial integration. Even though financial 
integration and contagion are found, to a larger or smaller extent, in a worldwide context, the European 
Union (EU) is regarded as the main workhorse for such investigations, in part owning to the long 
tradition of common institutions, rules and regulations and the existence of a monetary union. Financial 
integration in the EU has been perceived as an essential element for the effective implementation of 
European Central Bank (ECB) economic policies (ECB, 2010) with beneficial effects upon prosperity 
and economic wellbeing. By contrast, financial contagion is associated with uncertainty, market 
downturns and periods of economic, and often, political instability. The appeal and retraction of 
financial integration and contagion respectively may be evidenced by the expansion of the EU from 15 
to 28 country members in the years prior to the GFC but also the increasing appreciation of a 
retrenchment to national borders policy in the years following the GFC and ESDC.2  
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 The popular representation of the hard-working North versus the lazy-South has also received much attention and highlights 
the lack of uniformity within the EU (Charlemagne, 2010). In June 2016, a referendum in the UK highlighted that continued 




Albeit there is an agreement in the literature about what financial contagion is about, no universally 
accepted definition of financial contagion exists. Instead, the definition of financial contagion seems to 
be customised to a handful of research methodologies that have been employed over the years, see 
Karolyi (2003) and Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, & Martin (2005) for some surveys on the topic. 
For example, contagion has been defined as a rise in the probability that a country experiences a crisis 
given that a crisis is developing in another country (Eichengreen and Rose, 1999). Alternative 
definitions suggest that contagion is identified by correlation levels beyond those that may be explained 
by economic fundamentals. As such, related approaches typically build on factor models where 
observable or latent fundamental factors and financial contagion tests are applied, see for example 
(Bekaert et al., 2014, 2005). Forbes & Rigobon (2002) provide yet another definition, that of an increase 
in cross-market linkages following an economic shock in RQHQDWLRQ7KLV³VKLIW-FRQWDJLRQ´GHILQLWLRQ
has the advantage of using correlation values that are intuitively straightforward to interpret and 
integrate well within the financial integration framework (Bekaert et al., 2009). Furthermore, this 
definition matches with investor perceptions about risk. When markets drop, investors reduce their 
exposure to risky assets by rebalancing their portfolios, hence placing more weight on easily available 
public information (i.e., herding behaviour), while often ignoring fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2014; 
Kumar and Persaud, 2002).  
 
7KH ³VKLIW-FRQWDJLRQ´ GHILQLWLRQ EHFDPH TXLWH SRSXODU IROORZLQJ WKH LQQRYDWLRQ RI PXOWLYDULDWH
GARCH models (e.g., ADCC-GARCH) that were capable of producing conditional correlation 
estimates, while handling a large number of assets, see for example Cappiello, Engle, & Sheppard 
(2006), Engle (2002), Tse & Tsui (2002). Much of the empirical literature investigates the existence of 
contagion following some crisis event. For example, Chiang et al., (2007) and Cho & Parhizgari (2008) 
look into East Asian stock market exchanges and find evidence of contagion after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Yiu et al., (2010) and Naoui et al., (2010) focus on the 2000 dot.com and the GFC crisis 
and find evidence of contagion between the US and East Asia. Kenourgios (2014) compares the 
contagion experience of developed versus developing countries across a wide range of financial crises. 
 
A large part of the literature has focused on financial crises, such as the GFC and ESDC, with several 
studies investigating contagion and financial linkages in multiple frameworks, such as cross-country 
(Alexakis et al., 2016; Dimitriou et al., 2017, 2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012; Ludwig, 2014; 
Mollah et al., 2016; Neaime, 2016; Romero-Meza et al., 2015; Suh, 2015; Wang et al., 2017), cross-
industry (Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015), cross-asset (Aloui et al., 2015; Leung et al., 2017; 
Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2014a) or some combination. A variety of asset classes has been examined 
including equity indices (Bhatti and Nguyen, 2012; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Kenourgios et al., 2016; 
Luchtenberg and Vu, 2015; Pappas et al., 2016; Romero-Meza et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017; Yang 
and Hamori, 2013; Ye et al., 2017), CDS spreads (Broto and Pérez-Quirós, 2014; Kenourgios and Padhi, 
2012; Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2016, 2014b, 2013a; Wang and Moore, 2012), bond markets (Claeys 
DQG9DãtþHN14; Coudert and Gex, 2010), implied volatility markets (Kenourgios, 2014), exchange 
rates (Dimitriou and Kenourgios, 2013; Khalid and Rajaguru, 2007; Leung et al., 2017), individual 
stocks (Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2013b) and commodities (Aboura and Chevallier, 2015; Algieri and 
Leccadito, 2017; Gozgor et al., 2016) among others.  
 
In our analysis, we focus on cross-country and cross-sector contagion during the GFC and the ESDC. 
Cross-sectorial contagion has largely been overlooked even though there has been empirical evidence 
WKDWVXFKIDFWRUVFDQSRVHDQLPSRUWDQWWKUHDWWRDQLQYHVWRU¶VSRUWIROLRGXULQJWXUEXOHQWWLPHV (Baca et 
al., 2000; Baur, 2012; Cavaglia et al., 2000; Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015; Phylaktis and Xia, 2009). 
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Particularly in the EU context, geographical diversification may be of decreasing importance, while 
sectorial diversification may still be more effective (Eiling et al., 2012). Furthermore, the GFC has 
placed most of the attention on the financial sector, but contagion through non-financial sectors is also 
important, particularly during economic downturns (Akhtaruzzaman and Shamsuddin, 2016). 
 
Our paper extends the previous literature by investigating cross-country and cross-sector financial 
contagion within the EU during the GFC and ESDC crises. In this respect, we adopt and extend Baur 
(2012) approach by investigating cross-sector contagion. Contrary to Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) 
we do not rely on aggregated geographically-focused sectorial indices but we analyse sectorial equity 
indices from each EU member country. Our extended sample may be better suited to capture the full 
magnitude of the ESDC for two reasons; first our sample ranges till 2014 ± much later than either Baur 
(2012) and Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015), second we include all EU-15 countries.3  
 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use daily stock market sectorial indices from Dow Jones for 15 European countries covering the 
period from 1st January 2004 until 31st December 2014, giving a sample size of 2,870 observations. We 
opted to start from 2004 so as to eliminate any potential spin-off effect from the earlier ³dot.com´ crisis; 
hereby focusing exclusively on the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(ESDC). The sectors included are Financials, Consumer Goods, Telecommunications, Health Care and 
Industrials.  
 
The countries selected are the EU-15 group of countries that participated in the European Union until 
the 30th of April 2004.4 These countries are Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), 
Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), 
United Kingdom (UK), Austria (AT), Finland (FI) and Sweden (SE). In many databases Belgium and 
Luxembourg are reported together as one country, whereas no data were available for the Health Care 
index in Austria. For each Dow Jones stock index, the continuously compounded return is calculated 
as D?௧ ൌ ሺD?௧ D?௧ିଵሻ ൈ ⁡?⁡?⁡?⁡? , where D?௧ is the closing price at day D?. To facilitate discussion and to identify 
similarities across the EU countries we define the three following groups: Core EU (Austria, 
Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Netherlands and the UK), PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain) and the Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). The Scandinavian nations 
share a common history and significant trade linkages. Furthermore, Denmark and Sweden opted not 
to join the Eurozone. Finally, recent discussions relating to competitiveness, fiscal deficits and public 
debt problems underpin the PIIGS group of nations, see for example, Gebka & Karoglou  (2013).  
 
Table 1 (Panels A-E) presents key descriptive statistics for the Financial, Consumer Goods, 
Telecommunications and Health Care and Industrials indices for the respective countries. The stylised 
facts of non-normality of returns and excess kurtosis are verified for all sectors. However, the financial 
profile of the sectors shows increased heterogeneity in terms of mean return and annualised volatility.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
                                                 
3
 Baur (2012) and Bekaert et al., (2014) have 2009 as their last year of observations, while Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015) 
extend this to 2010. Besides, Baur (2012) includes 25 countries but only 6 are from the EU. 
4
 We would have liked to include the whole EU-28 but this was not possible due to data availability issues for some (or all) 
sectorial equity indices. 
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of the sectorial equity indices during the sample period. A high degree of 
alignment is observed across all countries and for all four sectorial indices. The alignment becomes 
more evident after the start of the financial turmoil (1st August 2007), intensifies further following the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers on the 15th of September 2008 and eases of till the announcement of 
the Greek budget deficit (5th November 2009), where it intensifies again. Interestingly, the Health care 
sector seems the least affected from either crisis. 
 




The multivariate DCC-GARCH framework, albeit common in financial contagion/linkages studies, is 
by no means the only approach that has been utilised. For example, Albulescu, Goyeau, & Tiwari 
(2015), Aloui et al., (2015), Bodart & Candelon (2009), Burzala (2016) use wavelet techniques and co-
spectral analysis. In addition, BEKK models (Boamah, 2017; Jin & An, 2016; Koedijk, Kool, Schotman 
& van Dijk, 2002), cointegration relationships (Boubaker et al., 2016; Sander and Kleimeier, 2003), 
copulas (Bhatti and Nguyen, 2012; Horta et al., 2010; Kenourgios et al., 2011; Okimoto, 2008; 
Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2014b; Yang et al., 2015; Yang and Hamori, 2013) and Markov-Switching 
models (Guidolin and Pedio, 2017) have also been adopted among others. There is evidence from the 
literature that the DCC-GARCH and Copula approaches are similar in the context of financial contagion 
(Kenourgios et al., 2011). Wavelet techniques may allow for more complexity, but at the expense of 
ease of interpretation compared to the DCC approach. For these reasons, and also to make our study 
comparable to a large part of the literature we use a DCC-GARCH approach. In the following sections 
we outline the estimation techniques utilised in greater detail. 
 
4.1 The Empirical Model 
We consider an asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation (ADCC)-GARCH model, similar to Gjika 
& Horváth (2013). This model accounts for both the time varying nature and asymmetry of the cross-
movement of volatilities. Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)-GARCH models were introduced 
separately by Engle (2002) and Tse & Tsui (2002), with the two approaches differing in the 
parameterisation of the conditional correlation matrix. Subsequent extensions of DCC-GARCH models 
are of two kinds. The first is in the volatility modelling phase where the univariate GARCH has been 
superseded by models that account for asymmetries (EGARCH, GJR-GARCH), long-memory 
(FIGARCH) and regime changes (MS-GARCH) to name a few. The second relates to the DCC 
estimator itself, with the corrected DCC-GARCH model proposed by Aielli (2013) providing an 
alternative, asymptotically unbiased, estimator.5 Further extensions include the asymmetric DCC 
(ADCC) model, which allows for asymmetric effects to impact the conditional correlations Cappiello 
et al., (2006). 
In general, the estimation of an ADCC-GARCH type of model consists of three phases (Engle, 2002). 
In the first phase, univariate GARCH models are fitted to the asset returns. In the second phase, the 
unconditional correlation and covariance matrices of both standardised returns and negative 
standardised returns are estimated. The third phase consists of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure for the conditional correlation dynamics.  
                                                 
5
 Note though that the bias of the DCC-GARCH estimator is negligible even in large samples (Caporin and McAleer, 2014). 
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To outline the framework, consider a D? ൈ ⁡? vector of asset returns in which, D?௧ is normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance D?௧  
 D?௧ȁE?௧ିଵ⁡?D?ሺ⁡?ǡ D?௧ሻ (1)  
 D?௧ଶ ൌ D? ൅෍E?௜௣௜ୀଵ D?௧ି௜ଶ ൅෍E?௝௤௝ୀଵ D?௧ି௝ଶ ൅෍E?௞௥௞ୀଵ D?௧ି௞ଶ D?௧ି௞ (2)  
 
where F?௧ିଵis the information set at time D? െ ⁡?, D?௧ ൌ ⁡? if D?௧ ൏ ⁡? and zero otherwise, and the variance 
process is characterised by a threshold GARCH process. In this case we opt for the widely adopted, see, 
GJR-GARCH(1,1,1) model of Glosten, Jagannathan, & Runkle (1993), in line with Kenourgios (2014), 
that allows asymmetrical effects on the conditional variance, and is given by: 
 D?௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅D?௧ ǡ D?௧ ⁡?D?D?D?ሺ⁡ ǡ D?௧ሻ (3)  
 D?௧ଶ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵD?௧ିଵଶ ൅ D?ଵD?௧ିଵଶ ൅ D?ଵD?௧ିଵଶ D?௧ିଵ (4)  
 
For the D? ൈ D? matrix of asset returns the time-varying covariance matrix E?௧ is defined as a product of 
time-varying standard deviations and time-varying correlations as follows: 
 E?௧ ൌ E?Ԣ௧E?௧E?௧ (5)  
where 
 E?௧ ൌ D?D?D?D?ሼD?ଵ௧ଵȀଶǡ ǥ ǡ D?ே௧ଵȀଶሽ (6)  
 
To incorporate asymmetries in the correlation dynamics Cappiello et al., (2006) modify the conditional 
correlation equation of Engle (2002) to the one given below:  
 E?௧ ൌ ൭⁡? െ ෍ D?௠ெ௠ୀଵ െ෍D?௡ே௡ୀଵ ൱E?ഥ െ෍D?௞E?ഥ௄௞ୀଵ ൅ ෍ D?௠ሺD?௧ି௠D?௧ି௠ᇱ ሻெ௠ୀଵ൅෍D?௞ሺD?௧ି௞D?௧ି௞ᇱ ሻ௄௞ୀଵ ൅෍D?௡E?௧ି௡ே௡ୀଵ  
(7)  
where D?௧ takes the value 1 when D?௧ ൏ ⁡? , zero otherwise, representing therefore bad news. For the 
matrix E?௧ to be positive definite, a set of restrictions is imposed. These restrictions require that: i) D?௠ ൐⁡?; ii) D?௡ ൐ ⁡?; iii) D?௞ ൐ ⁡?; iv) ⁡? D?௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ⁡? D?௡ே௡ୀଵ ൅ D?⁡? D?௞௄௞ୀଵ ൏ ⁡? and D? ൌmaximum 
eigenvalueሾE?ഥିଵȀଶE?ഥE?ഥିଵȀଶሿ is estimated from the data. A rescaling of Qt ensures that the correlation 
matrix is well-defined with unitary values along the main diagonal and with each off-diagonal element 
ranging in absolute value between zero and one (Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta, 2008). The formula for 
the rescaling of correlations is: 
 E?௧ ൌ ሺE? ל E?௧ሻିଵȀଶE?௧ሺE? ל E?௧ሻିଵȀଶ (8)  
where E? is the identity matrix and ל denotes the Hadamard product. 
 
For the multivariate part of our setting (the univariate is described in the next section), we adopt an 
ADCC (1, 1, 1), following Gjika and Horváth (2013) among others. This is given by: 
 E?௧ ൌ ሺ⁡? െ D? െ D?ሻEഥ െ D?E?ഥ ൅ D?ሺE?௧ିଵE?௧ିଵᇱ ሻ ൅ D?ሺE?௧ିଵE?௧ିଵᇱ ሻ ൅ D?E?௧ିଵ (9)  
 
4.2 Statistical analysis of ADCC behaviour during the crises 
To structure our hypotheses, we modify the testing framework of Baur (2012) and Kenourgios & 
Dimitriou (2015) to our aims and objectives. In particular, assuming that financial contagion can spread 
both across countries and business sectors, we define the following three variants. We dub these as 
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cross-country, within-sector (Variant I), within-country, cross-sector (Variant II) and cross-country, 
cross-sector (Variant III). The first variant examines if financial contagion evidence varies by business 
sector. This would identify the business sectors that act as the best/worst conduits in transmitting 
financial contagion across countries. The second variant investigates how contagion spreads across 
business sectors, within the same country. As the business sectors across the EU countries may share 
different dynamics, this variant allows us to identify where cross-sector financial contagion resilience 
is greatest/lowest. As the first two variants restrict the analysis by holding either the sector or the 
country constant; the third variant generalises this by allowing both the country and the business sector 
to vary at the same time. Financial contagion between the Telecommunication equity indices of France 
and Italy would be an example of Variant I. The second variant examines contagion evidence from the 
Financials equity index of Italy to the Telecommunications equity index of Italy. The link between the 
Financials equity index of France and the Telecommunications equity index of Italy falls under Variant 
III.  
Our testing approach is built on a regression framework where the dependent variable is the appropriate 
conditional correlation estimate from the ADCC-GJR-GARCH stage. The explanatory variables are 
seven dummy variables equal to one for each phase of the crises and zero otherwise according to the 
period identification explained in a previous section. Using these dummy variables allows identifying 
which of the phases, across the stable and turmoil periods, exhibit financial contagion for the indices 
examined. In all three variants of financial contagion our testable hypotheses relate to an increase in the 
dynamic conditional correlation estimates. Hence the statistical significance for the correlation across 
the identified periods boils down to t-test statistics where rejection of the null hypothesis ሺD?଴ሻ over the 
one-sided alternative ሺD?ଵሻ would give statistical evidence in favour of financial contagion. The 
following equation is estimated: 
where D?௜௝ǡ௧ is the pairwise conditional correlation between different indices, the dummy variables D?D?D?௞ǡ௧׊D? ൌ ⁡?ǡǥ ǡ⁡? correspond to the four phases of the GFC and the three phases of the ESDC, D?௜௝ǡ௧ିଵ is a first order autoregressive term and D?௜௝ǡ௧ is the standard stochastic error term. The equation is 
estimated using maximum likelihood and Newey-West robust standard errors. 
 
4.3 Turmoil period identification 
Turmoil period identification typically follows either an economic approach which is based on major 
economic and financial events (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) or a statistical approach where 
endogenously identified structural breaks on the series of interest would give evidence of a transition 
to a crisis period (Boyer et al., 2006; Rodriguez, 2007; Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2014c). Each comes 
with advantages and disadvantages. For example, with the economic approach it may be unrealistic to 
assume that one event is equally applicable to all examined countries at the same point in time. 
Similarly, there is an abundance of statistical methods that can identify regimes in a financial times 
series that include but are not limited to smooth transition autoregressive models (SETAR) (Teräsvirta, 
1994), Markov-Switching models (Hamilton, 1994) and structural break-point tests (Bai and Perron, 
 D?௜௝ǡ௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?D?௜௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅෍D?௞D?D?D?௞ǡ௧଻௞ୀଵ ൅D?௜௝ǡ௧ (10) 
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2003).6 Therefore some researchers opt to do a combination of an economic and a statistical approach 
(Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015; Pappas et al., 2016). In this study we mainly rely on an economic 
identification but we use a Markov-Switching model to compare and contrast the differences between 
the economically defined crisis transition dates and those estimated from the Markov model across the 
countries and the sectorial indices, following Pappas et al., (2016). 
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2009) and the (Federal Reserve Board of St. 
Louis (2009) the GFC is separated into four phases. Phase 1 starts on the 1st of August 2007 and ends 
on the 15th RI 6HSWHPEHU  WHUPHG WKH ³LQLWLDO ILQDQFLDO WXUPRLO´ 3KDVH  VSDQQLQJ from 16th 
September 2008 until 31st 'HFHPEHULVDSHULRGRI³VKDUSILQDQFLDOPDUNHWGHWHULRUDWLRQ´3KDVH
 LV WHUPHG DV ³PDFURHFRQRPLF GHWHULRUDWLRQ´ st January 2009-31st March 2009) and phase 4 as 
³VWDELOL]DWLRQDQGWHQWDWLYHVLJQVRIUHFRYHU\´IUom 1st April 2009 onwards. The ESDC is identified 
based on timelines from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Reuters and summarized by Kenourgios 
(2014). Phase 1 dates from 5th November 2009 until 22nd April 2010 including the Greek budget deficit 
announcement and the sharp increase of European sovereign risk. Phase 2 (23rd April 2010-14th July 
2011) begins before the Greek bailout in May 2010 when the country requested bailout funds from the 
Eurozone and the IMF. Phase 3 (15 July 2011 onwards) initiated when European authorities published 
the banking stress tests and other European countries (i.e., Italy) announced austerity measures.  
Markov-switching models, introduced by Hamilton (1994), permit the endogenous estimation of crisis 
dates, while determining the prevalence of one of two regimes7; a tranquil, relatively stable regime of 
the economy and a turbulent one that intuitively corresponds to a crisis regime. Mandilaras & Bird 
(2010) use a Markov-switching in a VAR setting to detect contagion effects in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) for 9 countries over the period 1978 - 1993. Baele (2005) finds that volatility 
spillovers to 13 European stock markets - from within the EU and the USA over the period 1980-2001 
- have been intensified during the crisis regimes, which are identified via a Markov-switching model. 
A Markov-Switching set-up allows transition probabilities to be estimated, from one state of the 
economy to another.8 Markov-Switching models rely on the data to identify the timing of the shift.9 
Typically a latent state variable ሺD?௧ሻ is used to denote which of the D? states the economy is in period D? 
with D?௧ ൌ D?Ǣ D? ൌ ⁡?ǡǥ ǡ D?. In our case the Markov-Switching model assumes the existence of two 
UHJLPHV³FDOP´DQG³WXUPRLO´EDVHGRQWKHFRQGLWLRQDOYRODWLOLW\VHULHV; see equation (4). Upon the 
identification of the two regimes, we compute the synchronisation variable (Sync), in line with Pappas 
et al., (2016) as follows: 
                                                 
6
 Several studies have suggested alternative techniques to tackle effectively the same problem. For example, Olbrys & 
Majewska (2014) GLYLGHPDUNHWVWDWHVLQWR³XS´DQG³GRZQ´PDUNHWVLQDQDWWHPSWWRDVVHVVWKHWLPLQJRIFULVLVSHULRGVIRU
the Central and Eastern Europe stock markets. Dividing the volatility series according to the timing of structural breaks prior 
to testing for financial contagion is followed in Blatt, Candelon, & Manner (2014). 
7
 Markov-switching models can be estimated for more than two regimes. However, as the number of regimes increases the 
computational burden gets more pronounced without a clear benefit in terms of interpretation. 
8
 The Markov-Switching model of Hamilton (1994) belongs to the family of non-linear models which includes SETAR (Tong, 
1995) and LSTAR models (Teräsvirta, 1994). For a broader discussion of these models the reader is directed to (Tsay, 2010). 
9
 Strictly speaking, a Markov-switching model employs a state variable which is governed by a first-order Markov chain; thus 
leaving no room for explanatory variables. The more generic time-varying transition probability models may include 
explanatory variables to determine the regime of the economy at the cost, however, of greater complication (Filardo, 1994). 
 D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௠ ൌ D?஼೔ǡ೘ െ D?஼್೐೙೎೓ (11) 
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where D? denotes the nation, D? denotes the business sector, D?஼೔ denotes the crisis transition date for each 
nation and D?஼್೐೙೎೓ corresponds to the crisis benchmark date. Positive (negative) values indicate a lag 
(lead) in the transition, relative to the benchmark date for the particular country/business sector. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 ADCC-GJR-GARCH results 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients, standard errors, goodness-of-fit statistics for the univariate 
parts of the ADCC-GJR-GARCH model estimated for each country. Panel A reports the statistics for 
the Financials equity indices, while Panels B-E repeat for the sectors of Telecommunications, Health 
Care, Consumer Goods and Industrials respectively. The volatility of most of the indices (Panels A-E) 
displays a high persistence since the sum of the estimated ARCH and GARCH (D?ଵ+D?ଵ) coefficients in 
each variance equation is close to unity. The leverage terms D?ଵ are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the volatility of all equity indices exhibits asymmetric responses to good and bad news. 
Moreover, the impact of the bad news ሺD?ଵ ൅ D?ଵሻ is greater in magnitude compared to the good news ሺD?ଵሻ, for the Health Care, Telecommunications, Industrials and, particularly, the Financials sectors. 
Interestingly, the volatility of the Consumer Goods sector appears more sensitive to positive shocks; a 
potentially interesting finding for portfolio managers. The parameters for the ADCC model are 
statistically significant and non-negative, which justifies the appropriateness of the ADCC-GJR-
GARCH model.10 
[Table 2 around here] 
5.2 Financial contagion 
5.2.1 Variant I: Cross-country within-sector financial contagion 
Table 3, Panels A-E, present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for equation (10) associated 
with cross-country within-sector financial contagion across the phases of the GFC and the ESDC. The 
table also reports a battery of statistical significance tests that assess the overall statistical significance 
of the dummy variables and two key subsets of them, one related to the GFC and another to the ESDC. 
Whether the shift in the conditional correlation at the peak of the GFC and the ESDC crises is 
significantly different is assessed via a t-test. The logarithmic change between the corresponding 
coefficients is also reported with positive values indicating that the ESDC has been the most 
pronounced. Panel A, focuses on the contagion effects between the Financials equity indices, while 
Consumer Goods, Telecommunications, Health Care and Industrials are reported in Panels B-E 
respectively. 
[Table 3 around here] 
[Figure 2 around here] 
The results (see also Figure 3) verify that financial contagion is evidenced at varying intensities, if at 
all, across the five examined business sectors. On average, financial contagion during phase 2 of the 
GFC is the strongest in Financials (1.21% increase), followed by Consumer Goods (0.90% increase), 
Telecommunications (0.78% increase), Health Care (0.23% increase) and Industrials (0.18% increase). 
                                                 
10
 These results are omitted for brevity but they are available on request. 
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The financial contagion associated with the ESDC (phase 2) both stronger in magnitude and impacts 
the business sectors in a different manner compared to the GFC. In particular, Telecommunications are 
the most affected (2.28% increase), followed by Financials (2.01% increase), Health Care (1.69% 
increase), Industrials (1.27% increase) and Consumer Goods (0.45% increase). Nevertheless, in both 
cases the Financials and Telecommunications sectors proved to be the most affected. This is not an 
unanticipated result. Financial sector is expected to be strongly affected by financial crisis since it is 
highly exposed as it is linked with all other industries through the financial business of lending. Thus, 
it receives quickly the negative effects of a financial crisis because of the nature of its business, which 
is further aggravated by the derivative operations. On the other hand, Telecommunications is the most 
heavily leveraged industry (see also Table 4) and it is well known that leverage may aggravate financial 
losses. In addition, financing costs exceed the income generated by the leveraged asset, due to the 
volatile demand and the rapid technology changes. In particular, the Telecommunications sector is 
characterized by large investments in assets which, however, become quickly obsolete due to rapid 
technology changes. Consequently, investors in this hi-tech sector are mainly drawn by short-term 
return prospects, with little emphasis on longer-term prospects, which may contribute, in part, to the 
observed significant contagion effect. The above leverage effect in combination with the size of the 
Telecommunications sector, as seen again in Table 4, may result to the estimated sensitivity of this 
sector to the financial crisis.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Certain country group pairs are more affected by financial contagion of specific business sectors. For 
example, financial contagion between the PIIGS / Core EU country groups is manifested for four out 
of the five sectors, in the case of the GFC, and all sectors in the ESDC case, at varying intensities. In 
particular, during phase 2 of the GFC the correlation between these two groups increases by 1.47% for 
the Financials sector, with the other sectors showing more muted evidence as highlighted by the 
increases of 1.18%, 0.94% and 0.48% for the Consumer Goods, Telecommunications and Health Care 
respectively. The same country pair during phase 2 of the ESDC records correlation gains of 2.42%, 
2.15%, 1.39%, 1.34% and 0.60% for the Financials, Telecommunications, Industrials, Health Care and 
Consumer Goods sectors respectively. The Consumer Goods and Industrials sector, in line with 
expectations are the least affected sectors during either crisis (Heaton, 2010). 
The remaining two country group pairs, namely Core EU-Scandinavian and Scandinavian-PIIGS 
broadly confirm these conclusions apart from the lack of contagion evidence for the Health care sectors 
between either Core EU / Scandinavian or Scandinavian / PIIGS groups during the GFC crisis, 
indicating the relevant robustness of this sector to financial crises. This may be related to the counter 
cyclical response of health expenditure to the GFC, where health expenditure was maintained in spite 
RI WKH *)&¶V VHYHULty (Keegan et al., 2013). Many countries however cut back on health related 
expenditure during the ESDC, see for example Ó Cinnéide & Considine (2010) for a case study of 
Ireland and Keegan et al., (2013) for Europe.     
Overall, our results verify that Financials and Telecommunications are the most affected business 
sectors during the GFC and ESDC respectively. Investments in the Industrials are relatively safe from 
financial contagion owing to financial crises, but not recessions; in the latter the Consumer Goods 
sectors appears to be the least affected. However, no business sector is immune to financial contagion 
from any type of crisis.  
5.2.2 Variant II: Within-country cross-sector financial contagion 
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Table 5, Panels A-C, present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for equation (10) associated 
with within-country cross-sector financial contagion across the phases of the GFC and the ESDC. The 
table also reports a battery of statistical significance tests that assess the overall statistical significance 
of the dummy variables and two key subsets, one related to the GFC and another to the ESDC. Whether 
the shift in the conditional correlation at the peak of the GFC and the ESDC crises is significantly 
different is assessed via a t-test. The logarithmic change between the corresponding coefficients is also 
reported with positive values indicating that the ESDC has been the most pronounced. Panel A, focuses 
on the contagion effects between the Financials and each of the Consumer Goods, Health Care, 
Telecommunications and Industrials sectors for the Core EU, with Panels B and C repeating for PIIGS 
and Scandinavian respectively.11  
[Table 5 around here] 
[Figure 3 around here] 
The results (see also Figure 4) support the existence of financial contagion for all three country groups. 
This is verified for both the GFC and the ESDC crises, albeit during the latter with a higher magnitude. 
In particular, the average correlation increases by 0.45% and by 1.20% for the GFC and ESDC 
respectively. The Core EU country group was the most severely affected by financial contagion during 
both crises, with an average correlation increase of 0.66% and 1.40% for GFC and ESDC respectively. 
By contrast, the PIIGS and the Scandinavian have been those the least affected by the GFC and the 
ESDC respectively.  
Cross sector differences reveal that the Industrials are generally the least affected in the Core EU and 
the Scandinavian but not in the PIIGS, a finding verified for both crises. More evidence for sectorial 
heterogeneity across the country groups is evident during the ESDC. Specifically, the Health Care in 
the Core EU is about six times more affected compared to the Scandinavian group.  
Overall, the results from the second variant of financial contagion show that all country groups were 
affected by financial contagion in both the GFC and ESDC crises. Albeit it may be expected that some 
sectors would be more affected than others, the patterns we unveil do not conform to some standard, 
which poses additional difficulties for market participants.   
5.2.3 Variant III: Cross-country cross-sector financial contagion 
Table 6, Panels A-D, present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for equation (10) associated 
with cross-country cross-sector financial contagion across the phases of the GFC and the ESDC. The 
table also reports a battery of statistical significance tests that assess the overall statistical significance 
of the dummy variables and two key subsets, one related to the GFC and another to the ESDC. Whether 
the shift in the conditional correlation at the peak of the GFC and the ESDC crises is significantly 
different is assessed via a t-test. The logarithmic change between the corresponding coefficients is also 
reported with positive values indicating that the ESDC has been the most pronounced. Panel A, focuses 
on the contagion effects between the Financials and the Consumer Goods sectors, with Panels B, C and 
D focusing on the contagion between Financials and Health Care, Telecommunication and Industrials 
sectors respectively.12 
                                                 
11
 One sector in these bivariate measures is the Financials as it has received prominent attention due to the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
12
 Each panel examines contagion in a two-way manner; that is contagion from Financials to Consumer Goods and Consumer 
Goods to Financials. For brevity, we have analysed those equity indices pairs where one sector is the Financials. 
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[Table 6 around here] 
[Figure 4 around here] 
Visual inspection of Figure 5 shows how financial contagion affected different sectors and countries, 
while allowing an easy comparison between the GFC and ESDC. The convention we follow in this 
figure is that in each country pair, the first country group is represented by the Financials sector, while 
the second varies between Consumer Goods (C), Health Care (H), Telecommunications (T) and 
Industrials (I). The figure itself is split into four quadrants, with the top-right being the Consumer Goods 
(according to the second country group in a pair), then moving clockwise with Health Care, 
Telecommunications and Industrials. The two crises are represented as different lines. A convex line in 
a quadrant would imply sectorial homogeneity across the country groups.  
For example, financial contagion in the Telecommunications quadrant during the ESDC has a more 
pronounced effect across the country groups than during the GFC. By contrast, the impact of the GFC 
on the Telecommunications has had a more uniform effect across the country groups than in Health 
Care.  
5.3 Synchronisation of the crisis phases 
Table 7 presents the estimated crisis transition dates and the lead/lag relationship (Sync) of the 
respective phases of the two crises as the latter have been identified in the timeline of Federal Reserve 
Board of St. Louis (2009) and BIS (2009) and analysed in an earlier section.13 As evidenced from the 
previous section where most transitions to a crisis regime were associated with the 2nd phase of the GFC 
and the 2nd and 3rd phases of the ESDC, we compare the Markov-estimated transitions dates to these 
three guideline dates. The Sync variable is in line with Pappas et al., (2016) and gauges the 
synchronicity of the transition into a crisis regime of the countries. Synchronicity of transition in/out of 
crisis is an important feature for policy makers and investors, as highlighted in (Tamakoshi and Hamori, 
2014c).  
[Table 7 around here] 
In the GFC case most of the countries of the Core EU and Scandinavian groups show a synchronised 
transition into a crisis regime, approximately 5 days after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Only 
exception is Germany which follows around 13 days later, SRVVLEO\ GXH WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V VWURQJHU
economic position. By contrast, the PIIGS are neither synchronised nor they follow suit. The larger 
economies within the PIIGS group, Italy and Spain appear more synchronised with their Core EU 
partners as indicated by the 5-day lag. However, Portugal and Greece are affected at a 20 and a 28-day 
lag respectively; a fact that could be associated with the lower trading activity in their stock markets 
and/or relative size of these economies.    
By contrast, during the ESDC crisis, the PIIGS are the countries that are affected the earliest, yet not 
fully in synchronisation due to the different nature of the problems that were brought to surface. For 
example, Ireland appears to be off-sync compared to the other PIIGS members possibly due to the 
banking nature of the problems it faced. A period of rapid economic growth reliant on a property bubble 
and fuelled both by the foreign direct investments and the abundance of credit by local banks has been 
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the main driver behind IrelDQG¶V ILQDQFLDO FULVLV H[SHULHQFH (Whelan et al., 2016). By contrast, in 
countries like Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain fiscal deficit, soaring public debt and decreasing 
competitiveness have been the main drivers.  
In the first phase of the ESDC, investor sentiment is largely unaffected as evident by the timing of the 
first estimated crisis transition date during the ESDC period that does not occur till the 29th of April 
2010 (which is well into the 2nd phase of the ESDC), with Portugal being the first to be affected, 
followed by Greece and Spain on the 5th of May. Around six months elapsed since the announcement - 
on the 20/10/2009 - that the Greek budget deficit was more than four times than that permitted till 
Greece officially asked for the EU/ECB/IMF (Troika) rescue mechanism on the 23/4/2010. During this 
period the severity of the upcoming debt crisis was largely underestimated or it was largely believed 
that the problems would be contained within Greece. It quickly turned out that the rest of the south-EU 
countries were in a similar situation with worsening fiscal deficits. The tip point was on the 2nd of May 
2010, when the $110 billion loan package at preferential interest rates was entered into; thus being the 
first time that a monetary value had been assigned to the ESDC. Amidst these developments, stock 
markets in the PIIGS enter into a crisis regime. The Core EU and Scandinavian countries were affected 
a week later when the $750 billion European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was deemed necessary 
to prevent contagion to other European countries by the unveiling sovereign debt crisis to which Greece, 
3RUWXJDO,WDO\DQG6SDLQZHUHWKH³ZHDNHVWOLQNV´,UHODQGKDVEHHQUHODWLYHO\XQDIIHFWHGE\WKHEXON
of these developments due to the banking nature of its problems up until 21st of November 2010 when 
it officially asked for support from the EFSF mechanism as the costs of bank restructuring had turned 
out to be much larger than anticipated, and consequently enters the crisis regime with a significant lag 
relative to the rest of the PIIGS.  
The start of the third phase of the ESDC is governed by the second bailout deal for Greece of an extra 
$109 billion and discussions for a significant contribution from private sector bondholders. Financial 
markets are sceptical about the successful completion of the private sector involvement and whether 
that would be sufficient to put Greece back on track. However, the variability in the Sync variable 
during the third phase of the ESDC shows that synchronised crisis transitions in the EU are no longer 
the case. This could be attributed to further developments at the south-EU states where Portugal, Spain 
and Italy realise that there is limited scope for a generalised solution14 to the European Sovereign Debt 
/ Low Competitiveness problem; hence each of these troubled countries should rely on their own means 
and biparty negotiations with European and international institutions (e.g., EFSF, IMF). At the same 
time the violent reactions to the austerity measures in Greece coupled with negative EU sentiment 
and/or the occasional break down of negotiations between Greek authorities and the Troika increased 
in frequency; thus distancing Greece further from either the rest of the PIIGS or the remaining EU 
countries. The latter, namely the Core EU and Scandinavian countries do not react in a uniform manner, 
in line with the disparity of political approaches about a solution to the ESDC crisis. The financially 
stronger economies of Germany and Netherlands are affected with a larger delay compared to France, 
whose debt-to-GDP ratio is worryingly increasing (Voss, 2011). By contrast, the UK that is not part of 
the Eurozone does not show any reaction to any of the ESDC phases.  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
                                                 
14
 Within the US and the UK, there are inter-regional permanent fiscal transfers that are non-existent within the Eurozone. The 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), two institutions that would allow 
the transfer of funds between EU nations for the short and long-term stability respectively came into force in 2013.  
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Financial contagion is an important aspect within the financial literature that typically examines the 
international cross-market linkages following a crisis event. In this paper we investigate the impact of 
the most recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) on the 
stock markets of the EU-15. We use sectorial equity indices over the 2004-2014 that represent the 
Financials, Consumer Goods, Telecommunications, Health Care and Industrials sectors. Our 
methodology utilises a multivariate ADCC-GJR-GARCH models to estimate dynamic conditional 
correlations, while a Markov-Switching model is used to identify the crisis transition dates for each 
market in each crisis. With regards to the financial contagion specification, we follow Forbes & Rigobon 
(2002) but we adjust our framework to cater for the sectorial data. In particular, we allow for three 
variants of financial contagion. The first looks at each business sector in isolation, but across countries. 
The second, focuses on specific countries, but across sectors. A third relaxes the former restrictions by 
looking at financial contagion cross-country and cross-sector at the same time. 
Our results show that the timing of the financial contagion differs between the GFC and the ESDC 
crises. The Core EU countries are affected first in the GFC crisis, but those of the PIIGS group are 
affected first in the case of the ESDC. In both cases, we find evidence of a non-synchronised transition 
of all countries to the crisis regime. With regards to financial contagion, our results confirm its presence 
for all business sectors under the GFC and the ESDC. Financials and Telecommunications are the most 
affected, while the Industrials and Consumer Goods sectors are the least affected during the GFC and 
ESDC respectively. In addition, all countries experienced financial contagion at varying magnitudes, 
with those in the Core EU being the most affected in both crises.  
The results of our study will be of a certain interest to investors and policy makers. Financial contagion 
has a damaging impact on portfolio diversification. According to our contagion results, although it is 
expected that some sectors would be more affected than others, the patterns we unveil neither conform 
to some pre-set standard nor are identical across the two crises. This may pose additional difficulties 
for market participants that wish to diversify geographically and/or by sector. Both the timing and the 
nature of the crisis are important to investors wishing to utilise the safest countries/sectors in their 
portfolios. ³7KHPDWLF´SRUWIROLRVZKLFKIRFXVRQVSHFLILFFRXQWULHVDQGRUVHFWRUVPLJKWturn out to be 
particularly risky. In terms of policy implications, we believe that it is important for policy makers to 
ensure that the financial system is in line with economic sustainability. This is the essence of the Final 
Report by the EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, which suggests that the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) must promote sustainable finance, while ensuring financial stability 
(European Commision, 2018). Hence, policy makers need to work together with the investment 
community and promote long-term investment strategies, particularly for sectors (besides Financials) 
that are known to be particularly sensitive to financial contagion, such as Telecommunications.  
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Figure 2. Cross-country, within-sector financial contagion  
Panel A: GFC (2nd phase)  
 
Panel B: ESDC (2nd phase)  
 
Notes: The charts show the increase in conditional correlations (as estimated from Eq.10) for the five 
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Figure 3. Within-country, cross-sector financial contagion  
Panel A: GFC (2nd phase)  
 
Panel B: ESDC (2nd phase)  
 
Notes: The charts show the increase in conditional correlations (as estimated from Eq.10) for the three 
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Figure 4. Cross-country, cross-sector financial contagion  
 
Notes: The charts show the increase in conditional correlations (as estimated from Eq.10) for the five 
business sectors and the three country groups in our sample for the GFC (blue line) and ESDC (orange line), 






















































































































Panel A: Financials 
Mean (%) 0.001 0.018 0.002 -0.002 -0.132 -0.125 -0.024 -0.019 -0.085 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 0.052 0.031 
Volatility (%) 28.917 29.742 36.964 32.968 59.482 67.594 35.891 42.487 40.137 34.627 30.904 38.3 29.138 33.738 
Min -13.141 -15.433 -13.711 -14.577 -27.921 -68.824 -12.366 -20.119 -23.934 -13.034 -14.168 -18.689 -14.225 -11.711 
Max 13.66 12.01 18.394 18.696 26.259 25.452 16.712 20.727 20.943 20.585 17.68 16.747 13.013 15.752 
JB 5900*** 4224*** 6581*** 11921*** 5756*** 111990*** 2846*** 12438*** 7484*** 6588*** 15477*** 9861*** 5298*** 5474*** 
Panel B: Consumer Goods 
Mean (%) 0.067 0.036 0.023 0.040 0.016 0.039 0.03 0.017 -0.012 0.036 0.036 -0.007 0.033 0.026 
Volatility (%) 32.033 28.16 24.494 34.014 37.123 24.047 28.849 22.204 30.45 21.086 19.243 30.225 35.721 27.249 
Min -19.671 -14.016 -10.932 -32.731 -19.202 -11.912 -10.244 -9.126 -26.929 -11.493 -9.321 -69.122 -14.926 -9.415 
Max 16.358 10.337 11.332 40.541 10.491 11.222 12.585 9.613 21.824 13.895 10.628 8.376 16.681 13.316 
JB 19550*** 6656*** 4211*** 1135800*** 2402*** 3428*** 1786*** 3193*** 209660*** 7562*** 9815*** 43944000*** 3522*** 3984*** 
Panel C: Telecommunications 
Mean (%) 0.004 0.034 -0.016 -0.004 -0.007 -0.052 -0.035 -0.013 -0.067 0.004 0.017 -0.018 0.031 0.007 
Volatility (%) 23.58 26.406 28.049 27.253 43.32 122.489 33.716 29.782 33.583 27.291 26.014 33.398 30.781 29.02 
Min -9.633 -18.148 -8.817 -14.985 -18.646 -79.816 -14.229 -17.483 -13.625 -11.386 -11.763 -21.331 -13.568 -9.55 
Max 9.012 15.135 12.073 16.959 17.072 82.236 13.013 15.304 18.642 13.191 11.822 16.597 17.864 11.222 
JB 1419*** 26468*** 1755*** 14125*** 2618*** 153990*** 2097*** 15074*** 9286*** 4545*** 5238*** 19603*** 9113*** 2139*** 
Panel D: Health Care 
Mean (%) 0.02 0.07 0.018 0.046 -0.088 0.042 0.01 0.019 -0.054 0.034 0.011 ² 0.043 0.046 
Volatility (%) 27.552 23.194 24.933 19.902 55.213 71.372 25.136 27.393 122.111 27.501 20.496 ² 28.423 28.674 
Min -12.445 -11.5 -9.986 -9.267 -30.068 -115.28 -8.728 -13.622 -110.96 -13.741 -9.27 ² -15.178 -10.588 
Max 16.437 9.951 14.282 9.454 138.58 23.786 9.189 10.69 119.96 10.602 10.102 ² 13.49 11.86 
JB 11841*** 4630*** 4058*** 4979*** 93849000*** 5043600*** 1198*** 2160*** 336610*** 2259*** 4908*** ² 8052*** 2329*** 
Panel E: Industrials 
Mean (%) -0.025 0.03 0.023 0.018 -0.016 0.016 -0.003 0.009 -0.033 0.025 0.032 0.018 0.044 0.037 
Volatility (%) 31.674 32.054 29.639 30.517 37.33 34.068 27.244 28.35 28.446 26.62 22.558 27.35 30.884 34.237 
Min -12.771 -15.354 -12.573 -13.494 -15.461 -13.68 -10.287 -11.352 -19.437 -10.233 -8.789 -9.497 -12.415 -10.77 
Max 11.997 14.787 14.258 18.678 13.229 13.11 8.858 12.391 11.904 10.426 8.763 10.116 11.628 14.812 
JB 1236*** 2089*** 3556*** 7357*** 1533*** 1184*** 1176*** 2217*** 19245*** 1329*** 2123*** 913*** 1240*** 1366*** 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of the returns during the full sample (2004-2014) and the crisis period (August 2007 - December 2014) for the 15 EU countries. Volatility denotes the 














































































Panel A: Financials 
ș0 0.0004* 0.0006** 0.0001 0.0005* 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007*** 0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Ȧ0 0.0238*** 0.0256*** 0.0243*** 0.0315*** 0.0245** 0.0089 0.0117*** 0.0255*** 0.0129* 0.0253*** 0.0132*** 0.0429*** 0.0297*** 0.0288*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0096) (0.0076) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0064) (0.0040) (0.0086) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0048) (0.0133) (0.0107) (0.0098) 
Į1 0.0303** 0.0583*** 0.0085 0.0494*** 0.0544*** 0.0495*** 0.0216** 0.0190 0.0576*** 0.0046 0.0215** 0.0231** 0.0169 0.0175* 
 (0.0132) (0.0171) (0.0076) (0.0134) (0.0111) (0.0186) (0.0090) (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0081) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0089) 
ȕ1 0.9218*** 0.9123*** 0.9304*** 0.9043*** 0.9203*** 0.9298*** 0.9353*** 0.9146*** 0.9181*** 0.9312*** 0.9309*** 0.9183*** 0.9378*** 0.9275*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0122) (0.0175) (0.0130) (0.0200) (0.0103) (0.0201) (0.0206) (0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0149) 
Ȗ1 0.0747*** 0.0439*** 0.1134*** 0.0757*** 0.0553*** 0.0542** 0.0802*** 0.1230*** 0.0558*** 0.1158*** 0.0847*** 0.0958*** 0.0682*** 0.0931*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0167) (0.0203) (0.0261) (0.0197) (0.0251) (0.0174) (0.0234) (0.0193) (0.0226) (0.0174) (0.0199) (0.0174) (0.0198) 
               
AIC -5.655 -5.553 -5.248 -5.482 -4.343 -4.367 -5.284 -5.205 -5.016 -5.311 -5.744 -5.195 -5.512 -5.389 
BIC -5.642 -5.544 -5.235 -5.470 -4.331 -4.355 -5.271 -5.193 -5.004 -5.299 -5.731 -5.183 -5.500 -5.376 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Panel B: Consumer Goods 
ș0 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0004 0.0004** 0.0006** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004* 0.0004** -0.0016** 0.0006* 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Ȧ0 0.0401** 0.0191*** 0.0208*** 0.0315*** 0.0945 0.0066* 0.0358*** 0.0174*** 0.0402 0.0279** 0.0247*** 1.5174*** 0.0631* 0.0261** 
 
(0.0190) (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0115) (0.0730) (0.0037) (0.0128) (0.0056) (0.0434) (0.0136) (0.0075) (0.5004) (0.0336) (0.0104) 
Į1 0.0002 0.0214* 0.0198** 0.0494*** 0.0459* 0.0105 0.0356*** 0.0121 0.0468*** 0.0310 -0.0055 5.1594 0.0241** 0.0138* 
 (0.0087) (0.0118) (0.0095) (0.0134) (0.0254) (0.0069) (0.0103) (0.0083) (0.0174) (0.0245) (0.0093) (9.1205) (0.0110) (0.0072) 
ȕ1 0.9494*** 0.9429*** 0.9245*** 0.9043*** 0.9037*** 0.9702*** 0.9195*** 0.9388*** 0.9667*** 0.9318*** 0.9201*** 0.0102 0.9326*** 0.9368*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0175) (0.0473) (0.0091) (0.0165) (0.0120) (0.0209) (0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0208) (0.0148) 
Ȗ1 0.0729*** 0.0541*** 0.0922*** 0.0757*** 0.0739* 0.0321*** 0.0642*** 0.0765*** -0.0421*** 0.0482* 0.1278*** -4.6801 0.0585** 0.0770*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0142) (0.0211) (0.0261) (0.0396) (0.0104) (0.0207) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0268) (0.0248) (9.0010) (0.0243) (0.0207) 
               
AIC -5.372 -5.665 -5.860 -5.535 -4.851 -5.781 -5.477 -6.008 -5.210 -5.929 -6.336 -5.096 -5.037 -5.646 
BIC -5.362 -5.655 -5.849 -5.525 -4.841 -5.770 -5.466 -5.997 -5.200 -5.919 -6.325 -5.085 -5.027 -5.635 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis of the univariate GJR-GARCH models of equation (3 & 4). AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria 














































































Panel C: Telecommunications 
ș0 0.0001 0.0006** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0007** 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Ȧ0 0.0471** 0.0648 0.0470 0.0682 0.0172** -0.0110 0.0240** 0.0255* 0.0119 0.0463*** 0.0516** 0.0974 0.4053 0.0485* 
 (0.0231) (0.0565) (0.0302) (0.0556) (0.0073) (0.0537) (0.0111) (0.0133) (0.0083) (0.0159) (0.0235) (0.0657) (0.4024) (0.0281) 
Į1 0.0147 0.0106 0.0108 0.0262 0.0123* 0.0048 0.0164* 0.0051 -0.0052* 0.0413*** 0.0461*** 0.0828 0.0609 0.0208 
 (0.0116) (0.0191) (0.0096) (0.0283) (0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0031) (0.0107) (0.0150) (0.0583) (0.0517) (0.0131) 
ȕ1 0.9422*** 0.9578*** 0.9551*** 0.9225*** 0.9612*** 0.9793*** 0.9554*** 0.9642*** 0.9724*** 0.9045*** 0.8978*** 0.8744*** 0.7503*** 0.9393*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0321) (0.0201) (0.0514) (0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0109) (0.0153) (0.0092) (0.0193) (0.0286) (0.0589) (0.1984) (0.0244) 
Ȗ1 0.0401*** 0.0146 0.0358*** 0.0491 0.0488*** 0.0412*** 0.0450*** 0.0444*** 0.0610*** 0.0717*** 0.0704** 0.0548 0.1680 0.0453** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0138) (0.0332) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0147) (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.0246) (0.0325) (0.0379) (0.1274) (0.0176) 
 
              
AIC -5.661 -5.419 -5.335 -5.514 -4.699 -2.318 -5.109 -5.330 -5.187 -5.599 -5.660 -5.150 -5.204 -5.386 
BIC -5.651 -5.408 -5.325 -5.504 -4.688 -2.305 -5.099 -5.320 -5.177 -5.589 -5.650 -5.139 -5.194 -5.376 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Panel D: Health Care 
ș0 0.0002 0.0007*** 0.0002 0.0006*** -0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0001 ² 0.0008** 0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0002) ² (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Ȧ0 0.0292 0.1059** 0.0524* 0.0676*** 0.0008*** 0.7783 0.0686** 0.0342** 2.3656 0.1094*** 0.0497* ² 0.5350** 0.0440** 
 
(0.0223) (0.0511) (0.0285) (0.0262) (0.0000) (1.6376) (0.0281) (0.0155) (1.9484) (0.0332) (0.0292) ² (0.2465) (0.0214) 
Į1 0.0165 0.0365 0.0309** 0.0677 0.1162*** 0.0094 0.0276* 0.0133 0.0278 0.0476** 0.0238 ² 0.0760** 0.0172* 
 (0.0212) (0.0252) (0.0135) (0.0538) (0.0376) (0.0279) (0.0168) (0.0135) (0.0262) (0.0204) (0.0154) ² (0.0351) (0.0104) 
ȕ1 0.9466*** 0.8812*** 0.9175*** 0.8644*** 0.8385*** 0.8358*** 0.9133*** 0.9512*** 0.9273*** 0.8897*** 0.9093*** ² 0.7300*** 0.9428*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0424) (0.0278) (0.0475) (0.0751) (0.1418) (0.0269) (0.0169) (0.0315) (0.0247) (0.0399) ² (0.0924) (0.0193) 
Ȗ1 0.0539*** 0.0627* 0.0563** 0.0456 -0.6225*** 0.4636 0.0552*** 0.0467*** 0.0108 0.0556*** 0.0651** ² 0.0557 0.0489** 
 (0.0175) (0.0336) (0.0253) (0.0400) (0.0897) (1.5694) (0.0191) (0.0123) (0.0299) (0.0193) (0.0274) ² (0.0526) (0.0198) 
               
AIC -5.505 -5.733 -5.652 -6.091 -3.967 -3.578 -5.603 -5.411 -2.401 -5.384 -6.064 ² -5.272 -5.391 
BIC -5.495 -5.723 -5.641 -6.080 -3.962 -3.568 -5.593 -5.401 -2.391 -5.373 -6.054 ² -5.261 -5.381 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 ² 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis of the univariate GJR-GARCH models of equation (3 & 4). AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Schwartz Information 














































































Panel E: Industrials 
ș0 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006*** 0.0004** 0.0005* 0.0007*** 0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Ȧ0 0.0514* 0.0370** 0.0305*** 0.0333*** 0.0234** 0.0186** 0.0199*** 0.0205 0.0264* 0.0248*** 0.0260*** 0.0293*** 0.0227*** 0.0208** 
 (0.0279) (0.0151) (0.0093) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0068) (0.0093) (0.0110) (0.0081) (0.0084) 
Į1 0.0285* 0.0153 0.0084 0.0123 0.0290*** 0.0217 0.0112 0.0115 0.0216 0.0036 0.0066 0.0178* 0.0222*** 0.0151* 
 (0.0164) (0.0107) (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0095) (0.0150) (0.0092) (0.0113) (0.0182) (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0090) 
ȕ1 0.9242*** 0.9411*** 0.9191*** 0.9278*** 0.9426*** 0.9500*** 0.9440*** 0.9465*** 0.9207*** 0.9424*** 0.9199*** 0.9419*** 0.9350*** 0.9412*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0173) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0245) (0.0317) (0.0095) (0.0187) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0125) 
Ȗ1 0.0611*** 0.0622*** 0.1215*** 0.0939*** 0.0509*** 0.0460*** 0.0696*** 0.0658** 0.1057** 0.0804*** 0.1119*** 0.0549*** 0.0703*** 0.0762*** 
 
(0.0228) (0.0166) (0.0257) (0.0224) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0174) (0.0274) (0.0506) (0.0157) (0.0275) (0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
 
              
AIC -5.324 -5.302 -5.596 -5.515 -4.916 -5.210 -5.626 -5.589 -5.613 -5.653 -6.032 -5.537 -5.446 -5.271 
BIC -5.313 -5.292 -5.586 -5.505 -4.905 -5.200 -5.615 -5.579 -5.600 -5.642 -6.021 -5.527 -5.435 -5.261 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis of the univariate GJR-GARCH models of equation (3 & 4). AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Schwartz Information 




Table 3. Estimation results for cross-country, within-sector financial contagion. 
  Panel A: Financials Panel B: Consumer Goods 




PIIGS-Core EU Core EU ± 
Scandinavian 




d1 0.0073*** 0.0089*** 0.0099*** 0.0161*** 0.0023*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
d2 0.0147*** 0.0088*** 0.0127*** 0.0118*** 0.0066*** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
d3 0.0133*** 0.0087*** 0.0121*** 0.0112*** 0.0075*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015) 
d4 0.0155*** 0.0102*** 0.0141*** 0.0102*** 0.0072*** 0.0045*** 




d5 0.0193*** 0.0115*** 0.0160*** 0.0076*** 0.0049** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
d6 0.0242*** 0.0156*** 0.0206*** 0.0060** 0.0065** 0.0009 
 (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0029) 
d7 0.0231*** 0.0151*** 0.0192*** 0.0077** 0.0046 0.0022 
 (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0033) 
 ĳ 0.9949*** 0.9961*** 0.9954*** 0.9948*** 0.9952*** 0.9948*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0020) 
 c0 0.6228*** 0.6783*** 0.5490*** 0.3944*** 0.5083*** 0.3887*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0155) 
LM(2) statistic 1.089 0.644 1.112 1.381 0.240 1.112 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 27.35*** 37.27*** 8.97*** 14.51*** 12.31*** 132.45*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 43.85*** 23.21*** 7.11*** 11.09*** 6.85*** 37.65*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 17.62*** 74.37*** 18.10*** 18.81*** 20.18*** 43.68*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.502 0.572 0.480 -0.677 -0.006 -2.251  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 4.066*** 4.110*** 3.127*** 3.023*** 0.020 3.723*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 




d1 0.0030*** 0.0044*** 0.0023*** 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
d2 0.0094*** 0.0083*** 0.0059*** 0.0048*** 0.0009 0.0013 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0009) 
d3 0.0095*** 0.0088*** 0.0067*** 0.0042** 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0014) 
d4 0.0143*** 0.0145*** 0.0140*** 0.0041* -0.0055 -0.0023 




d5 0.0179*** 0.0182*** 0.0179*** 0.0086*** 0.0060 0.0025 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0023) 
d6 0.0215*** 0.0228*** 0.0241*** 0.0134*** 0.0224*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0031) (0.0054) (0.0027) 
29 
 
d7 0.0201*** 0.0212*** 0.0230*** 0.0124*** 0.0217*** 0.0133*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0060) (0.0030) 
 ĳ 0.9988*** 0.9981*** 0.9977*** 0.9907*** 0.9903*** 0.9923*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
 c0 0.3361*** 0.3962*** 0.2975*** 0.2091*** 0.4084*** 0.2056*** 
  (0.0464) (0.0366) (0.0259) (0.0066) (0.0099) (0.0074) 
LM(2) statistic 0.364 0.380 0.074 0.790 1.915 1.145 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 2415.40*** 1950.71*** 1331.38*** 41.59*** 97.08*** 158.13*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 3996.44*** 3452.48*** 1897.12*** 9.09*** 17.19*** 17.80*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 1296.54*** 1063.46*** 1319.29*** 39.71*** 119.01*** 260.08*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.833 1.015 1.406 1.027 3.192 2.423  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 31.668*** 29.360*** 30.604*** 3.761*** 5.490*** 6.499*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 




d1 -0.0056*** -0.0062*** 0.0012    
 (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0013)    
d2 0.0002 -0.0027*** 0.0081***    
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0018)    
d3 0.0004 -0.0026*** 0.0089***    
 (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0021)    
d4 0.0039* -0.0021** 0.0106***    




d5 0.0111*** 0.0024** 0.0178***    
 (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0028)    
d6 0.0139*** 0.0041*** 0.0200***    
 (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0032)    
d7 0.0133*** 0.0043*** 0.0192***    
 (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0033)    
 ĳ 0.9948*** 0.9977*** 0.9946***    
  (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0023)    
 c0 0.6293*** 0.7239*** 0.6082***    
  (0.0192) (0.0394) (0.0204)    
LM(2) statistic 2.205 1.312 2.211    	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 65.26*** 97.09*** 40.47***    	 െ ୋ୊େ 25.60*** 40.82*** 14.81***    	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 21.33*** 16.32*** 7.95***    ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 4.513 2.530 0.910     െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 7.899*** 8.845*** 5.679***    
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869    
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC respectively. The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact of the ESDC has been more 




Table 4. Sectorial Financial Characteristics. 
Sectors Debt/Equity Debt/Capital Mcap (bil USD) 
Consumer Goods 97.33 42.31 42.00  
Financials 71.78 30.33 9.49  
Health Care 102.70 34.98 48.00  
Industrials 199.99 40.76 25.90  






Table 5. Estimation results for within-country, cross-sector financial contagion.  
  Panel A: Core EU Panel B: PIIGS Panel C: Scandinavian 
















d1 0.0024*** 0.0072*** 0.0053*** -0.0048*** -0.0119*** 0.0001*** 0.0034*** 0.0008*** 0.0016*** -0.0023*** 0.0059*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
d2 0.0052*** 0.0101*** 0.0147*** -0.0036*** -0.0093*** 0.0052*** 0.0096*** 0.0072*** 0.0032*** -0.0024*** 0.0087*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0005) 
d3 0.0053*** 0.0095*** 0.0142*** -0.0039*** -0.0092*** 0.0048*** 0.0095*** 0.0072*** 0.0037*** -0.0018* 0.0098*** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0006) 
d4 0.0050*** 0.0128*** 0.0170*** -0.0023*** -0.0065*** 0.0049*** 0.0146*** 0.0094*** 0.0048*** -0.0049*** 0.0139*** 0.0070*** 




d5 0.0064*** 0.0175*** 0.0215*** -0.0002 -0.0040*** 0.0073*** 0.0190*** 0.0139*** 0.0028*** -0.0022 0.0158*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0008) 
d6 0.0061*** 0.0232*** 0.0255*** 0.0013** -0.0014 0.0093*** 0.0233*** 0.0173*** 0.0053*** 0.0035* 0.0206*** 0.0094*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0009) 
d7 0.0052*** 0.0229*** 0.0247*** 0.0013* -0.0019* 0.0089*** 0.0215*** 0.0167*** 0.0053*** 0.0033 0.0180*** 0.0097*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0009) 
 ĳ 0.9966*** 0.9945*** 0.9936*** 0.9979*** 0.9975*** 0.9958*** 0.9939*** 0.9913*** 0.9970*** 0.9962*** 0.9933*** 0.9974*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0016) 
 c0 0.5760*** 0.4947*** 0.4984*** 0.7225*** 0.3724*** 0.2141*** 0.3587*** 0.5564*** 0.5778*** 0.4896*** 0.4907*** 0.6829*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0249) (0.0184) (0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0118) (0.0232) 
              
LM(2) statistic 0.276 2.349* 0.125 2.765 1.550 1.096 0.625 1.375 0.254 3.480** 0.663 3.306** 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 35.11*** 133.86*** 285.91*** 61.08*** 59.96*** 144.95*** 83.92*** 90.49*** 634.16*** 569.47*** 25.56*** 17.88*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 42.75*** 176.02*** 533.50*** 58.50*** 90.68*** 271.51*** 148.93*** 156.71*** 20.52*** 537.61*** 17.25*** 20.30*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 8.65*** 130.17*** 66.94*** 62.11*** 55.77*** 21.12*** 38.46*** 18.39*** 102.88*** 142.08*** 45.97*** 29.60*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.160 0.827 0.548 1.360 -1.883 0.588 0.889 0.879 0.494 2.468 0.868 0.538  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 1.111 7.585*** 6.542*** 10.760*** 10.101*** 4.157*** 9.280*** 5.129*** 2.761*** 4.399*** 1.869** 5.992*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC respectively. The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change 
between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact of the ESDC has been more pronounced. The  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ tests the equality of the 




Table 6: ± Panel A. Estimation results for cross-country, cross-sector financial contagion. 
 Financials Core EU PIIGS Core EU Scandinavian Scandinavian PIIGS 




d1 0.0013*** 0.0030*** 0.0012*** 0.0034*** -0.0129*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
d2 0.0022*** 0.0064*** 0.0023*** 0.0058*** -0.0112*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
d3 0.0022*** 0.0062*** 0.0023*** 0.0060*** -0.0106*** 0.0035*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
d4 0.0033*** 0.0064*** 0.0035*** 0.0057*** -0.0090*** 0.0051*** 




d5 0.0016 0.0082*** 0.0018* 0.0064*** -0.0077*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
d6 0.0041*** 0.0083*** 0.0045*** 0.0070*** -0.0053*** 0.0073*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
d7 0.0041*** 0.0076*** 0.0044*** 0.0057*** -0.0060*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0013) 
 ĳ 0.9968*** 0.9967*** 0.9971*** 0.9972*** 0.9976*** 0.9976*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
 c0 0.5713*** 0.4493*** 0.5642*** 0.5301*** 0.4158*** 0.4467*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0140) (0.0187) (0.0163) (0.0189) (0.0232) 
        
LM(2) statistic 0.180 0.962 0.083 1.442 0.559 0.550 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 644.27*** 50.39*** 659.27*** 51.70*** 94.13*** 45.91*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 92.67*** 89.52*** 114.38*** 42.34*** 68.85*** 49.42*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 100.10*** 2.30* 126.11*** 75.54*** 166.75*** 55.66*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.627 0.253 0.656 0.198 -0.736 0.670  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 2.192*** 2.009*** 2.646*** 1.887** 9.087*** 3.885*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC respectively. 
The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact of the ESDC 




Table 6 ± Panel B. Estimation results for cross-country, cross-sector financial contagion. 
 Financials Core EU PIIGS Core EU Scandinavian Scandinavian PIIGS 




d1 -0.0006 0.0071*** -0.0028*** 0.0082*** 0.0003 -0.0021 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
d2 0.0067*** 0.0106*** -0.0028*** 0.0109*** 0.0032*** -0.0013** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
d3 0.0059*** 0.0096*** -0.0028*** 0.0109*** 0.0032*** -0.0017* 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
d4 0.0065*** 0.0141*** -0.0059*** 0.0142*** 0.0030*** -0.0048*** 




d5 0.0087*** 0.0196*** -0.0006 0.0172*** 0.0047*** 0.0018 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0016) 
d6 0.0091*** 0.0255*** 0.0088*** 0.0220*** 0.0046*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0018) 
d7 0.0086*** 0.0249*** 0.0084*** 0.0222*** 0.0041*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0020) 
 ĳ 0.9945*** 0.9953*** 0.9959*** 0.9941*** 0.9958*** 0.9963*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
 c0 0.2556*** 0.3853*** 0.4619*** 0.4687*** 0.2461*** 0.3724*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0132) (0.0169) (0.0107) (0.0098) (0.0177) 
        
LM(2) statistic 1.590 1.055 2.967* 1.606 1.753 2.787* 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 314.07*** 35.82*** 444.24*** 30.58*** 106.72*** 166.63*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 181.41*** 36.45*** 98.77*** 32.74*** 35.24*** 15.18*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 23.10*** 53.09*** 427.12*** 43.62*** 1.92** 336.20*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.302 0.877 4.160 0.699 0.376 9.812  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 0.608*** 8.703*** 7.783*** 5.886*** 1.765** 3.997*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC respectively. 
The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact of the ESDC 




Table 6 ± Panel C. Estimation results for cross-country, cross-sector financial contagion. 
 Financials Core EU PIIGS Core EU Scandinavian Scandinavian PIIGS 




d1 0.0025*** 0.0060*** 0.0064*** 0.0065*** 0.0037*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
d2 0.0099*** 0.0139*** 0.0111*** 0.0104*** 0.0073*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
d3 0.0101*** 0.0133*** 0.0118*** 0.0102*** 0.0076*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
d4 0.0138*** 0.0173*** 0.0166*** 0.0126*** 0.0112*** 0.0171*** 




d5 0.0171*** 0.0224*** 0.0206*** 0.0153*** 0.0133*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
d6 0.0214*** 0.0268*** 0.0267*** 0.0190*** 0.0167*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0023) 
d7 0.0188*** 0.0260*** 0.0246*** 0.0183*** 0.0136*** 0.0263*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0027) 
 ĳ 0.9920*** 0.9943*** 0.9931*** 0.9939*** 0.9943*** 0.9931*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
 c0 0.4203*** 0.3936*** 0.4633*** 0.4662*** 0.3885*** 0.3606*** 
  (0.0084) (0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0114) 
        
LM(2) statistic 0.653 0.664 1.228 1.414 1.389 0.485 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 107.11*** 84.98*** 46.90*** 53.92*** 51.28*** 64.28*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 200.83*** 140.69*** 44.10*** 83.87*** 78.25*** 90.40*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 38.24*** 42.13*** 94.25*** 50.46*** 54.30*** 92.41*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.769 0.653 0.875 0.604 0.822 0.926  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 6.442*** 8.054*** 8.814*** 5.279*** 6.733*** 9.004*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two 
lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC 
respectively. The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact 





Table 6 ± Panel D. Estimation results for cross-country, cross-sector financial contagion. 
 Financials Core EU PIIGS Core EU Scandinavian Scandinavian PIIGS 




d1 0.0008 -0.0027*** 0.0028*** -0.0030*** 0.0010* 0.0039*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
d2 0.0063*** 0.0010 0.0054*** -0.0010*** 0.0043*** 0.0084*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
d3 0.0073*** 0.0008 0.0054*** -0.0008* 0.0051*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
d4 0.0088*** 0.0039*** 0.0064*** 0.0008 0.0066*** 0.0099*** 




d5 0.0120*** 0.0079*** 0.0086*** 0.0013** 0.0084*** 0.0137*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0021) 
d6 0.0144*** 0.0108*** 0.0102*** 0.0034*** 0.0110*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0024) 
d7 0.0141*** 0.0106*** 0.0102*** 0.0036*** 0.0106*** 0.0160*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0026) 
 ĳ 0.9945*** 0.9947*** 0.9972*** 0.9980*** 0.9960*** 0.9942*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
 c0 0.6277*** 0.5850*** 0.6774*** 0.6681*** 0.5922*** 0.5558*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0213) (0.0298) (0.0167) (0.0125) 
        
LM(2) statistic 1.060 1.212 0.270 2.919* 3.158* 0.564 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ 26.19*** 112.44*** 27.34*** 43.99*** 23.53*** 53.09*** 	 െ ୋ୊େ 35.57*** 189.34*** 23.49*** 57.96*** 25.44*** 75.71*** 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ 20.30*** 32.64*** 19.54*** 62.46*** 36.52*** 19.99*** ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ 0.827 2.380 0.630 4.453 0.935 0.660  െ ୋ୊େି୉ୗୈେ 6.522*** 6.684*** 6.555*** 8.996*** 7.265*** 4.567*** 
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (10) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for autocorrelation allowing for up to two 
lags. 	 െ ୋ୊େƬ୉ୗୈେ, 	 െ ୋ୊େand 	 െ ୉ୗୈେ test the joint significance of those dummy variables that correspond to both the GFC and the ESDC, only the GFC, only the ESDC 
respectively. The ȟሺ
	 െ ሻ reports the logarithmic change between the estimated coefficients that correspond to peak (i.e., the second phase) of each crisis and a positive value indicates that the impact 





Table 7. Synchronisation of GFC and ESDC Crises phases. 
 GFC Phase 2 ESDC Phase 2 ESDC Phase 3 
Country Crisis Transition Date Sync  Crisis Transition Date Sync  Crisis Transition Date Sync  
Denmark 22/09/08 5  07/05/10 13  19/08/11 34  
Finland 22/09/08 5  11/05/10 16  12/09/11 57  
Sweden 22/09/08 5  11/05/10 16  13/09/11 58  
   
       
Austria 22/09/08 5  ² ²  ² ²  
Belgium/Lux 22/09/08 5  11/05/10 16  ² ²  
France 22/09/08 5  11/05/10 16  11/08/11 26  
Germany 30/09/08 13  ² ²  12/09/11 57  
Netherlands 22/09/08 5  11/05/10 16  01/11/11 107  
UK 22/09/08 5  ² ²  ² ²  
   
       
Portugal 07/10/08 20  29/04/10 5  12/07/2011 -2  
Italy 22/09/08 5  07/05/10 13  11/07/2011 -3  
Greece 20/10/08 28  05/05/10 11  30/08/2011 45  
Ireland 30/09/08 8  24/11/10 211  ² ²  
Spain 22/09/08 5  05/05/10 11  11/08/2011 27  
Notes: The Synchronisation variable (D?D?D?D?௜ǡ௠) is given in equation 11, with the respective bench crisis D?஼್೐೙೎೓ dates being 16/09/2008 for GFC Phase 2, 
23/4/2010 for ESDC Phase 2 and 15/7/2011 for ESDC Phase 3. The crisis transition date column reports the estimated D?஼೔ǡ೘from the Markov-Switching 
model on the conditional volatilities of the equity indices. Calculations have been done for each business sector separately and here we report the average 
values. A ³²´LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHVSHFLILFPDUNHWKDVQHLWKHUEHHQDIIHFWHGE\WKDWparticular phase of the crisis nor any phase that followed. 
 
